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This paper explores the existence of downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) in the 
industry sectors of 14 European countries, over the period 1973–1999, using a data set of 
hourly nominal wages at industry level. Based on a novel nonparametric statistical method, 
which allows for country and year-specific variation in both the median and the dispersion of 
industry wage changes, we reject the hypothesis of no DNWR. The fraction of wage cuts 
prevented due to DNWR has fallen over time, from 70 percent in the 1970s to 20 percent in 
the 1990s, but the number of industries affected by DNWR has increased. Wage cuts are less 
likely in countries and years with high inflation, low unemployment, high union density and 
strict employment protection legislation. 
JEL classification: J5, C14, C15, E31. 
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 1 Introduction
In recent years, a number of countries have adopted explicit inﬂation targets for monetary policy,
reﬂecting a general agreement that monetary policy must ensure low inﬂation. The deliberate
policy of low inﬂation has led to renewed interest among academics as well as policy makers
for the contention of Tobin (1972) that if policy aims at too low inﬂation, downward rigidity of
nominal wages may lead to higher wage pressure, involving higher equilibrium unemployment
(see e.g. Akerlof et al., 1996, 2000, Holden, 1994, and Wyplosz, 2001). Other economists have
been less concerned, questioning both the existence of downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR),
and the possible macroeconomic eects (see e.g. Gordon, 1996 and Mankiw, 1996). The issue
has also received considerable attention among policy makers, cf. e.g. (ECB, 2003, OECD, 2002
and IMF, 2002).
To shed light of this issue, a fast growing body of empirical research has explored the existence
of DNWR in many OECD countries (see references in section 2 below). Almost all of these studies
use various kinds of micro data, mostly of the wage of individual workers, but occasionally also
the wage in speciﬁc jobs in individual ﬁrms. While these studies generally seem to document the
existence of DNWR, a number of key questions are still left unresolved. As the dierent studies
vary considerably concerning both type of data and the methods that are used, it is dicult to
compare the degree of DNWR across countries and the extent to which DNWR has varied over
time. Furthermore, while individual data is necessary to explore whether wages are rigid at
employee level, it will often be unable to answer the question of whether ﬁrms can circumvent
wage rigidity at the individual level, for example by changing the composition of the workforce
by turnover. Correspondingly, even if wage rigidity binds in one ﬁrm, jobs might be shifted over
to other ﬁrms where wages are lower, so that the industry eects are small. Then DNWR may be
less important for macroeconomic performance. It therefore seems valuable also to investigate
DNWR using industry level data.
2This paper explores the existence of DNWR in the industry sectors of 14 European countries,
over the period 1973–1999, using a data set of hourly nominal earnings at industry level. The
study is to be seen as complementary to the large number of micro studies, as it allows for com-
parisons across dierent groups of countries, and comparisons over time, based on a harmonized
data set (from Eurostat). More importantly, by using data for the hourly earnings at industry
level, our study captures eects of changes in the composition of the workforce, as well as the
eect of changes in the wage rates. Furthermore, our study covers a number of countries in
Continental Europe, for which there so far is little available evidence of the existence of DNWR,
in spite of the considerable policy importance of this issue in relation to the ambitious inﬂation
target of the ECB.
To investigate the extent of DNWR, we construct a statistical method not previously used
on this issue (at least to the best of our knowledge). The advantage of the method is that it
uses much weaker assumptions than most previous analyses, implying that the results should
be more robust. First, the method is based on a nonparametric analysis, using data for hourly
earnings only, so that no assumptions concerning explanatory variables or speciﬁc functional
forms are involved. Second, we allow for country and year speciﬁc variation in the median and
the dispersion of wage changes, while for instance the Kahn test (Kahn, 1997) only allows for
variation in the mean.
To further explore the determinants of nominal wage ridigidy, we then regress the incidence
of nominal wage cuts in each country-year sample on economic and institutional variables, like
inﬂation, unemployment, employment protection legislation, union density, etc.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we brieﬂy present the main theoretical
explanations for DNWR, and we refer to related empirical literature. The empirical approach
is laid out in Section 3, while the empirical results on DNWR are documented in Section 4. In
Section 5, we explore the determinants of nominal wage rigidity. Section 6 concludes. The data
3we use are described in the Appendix.
2 Theoretical framework and related literature
In the literature, two alternative explanations of the existence of DNWR have been proposed. The
most common explanation, advocated by e.g. Blinder and Choi (1990) and Akerlof et al. (1996),
is that employers avoid nominal wage cuts because both they and (in particular) the employees
think that a wage cut is unfair. The other explanation, proposed by MacLeod and Malcomson
(1993) in a individual bargaining framework, and Holden (1994) in a collective agreement frame-
work, is that nominal wages are given in contracts that can only be changed by mutual consent.
For our purposes, there is no need to distinguish between these two explanations of DNWR, and,
as argued by Holden (1994), they are likely to be complementary.
Concerning empirical work on DNWR, there is now a fairly large, and rapidly growing, num-
ber of recent studies, for many dierent countries, including Fehr and Gotte (2003) for Switzer-
land, Knoppik and Beissinger (2003) for Germany, Christoﬁdes and Leung (2003), and Fortin
and Dumont (2000) for Canada, Holden (1998) for the manufacturing sectors in the Nordic coun-
tries, Agell and Bennmarker (2002), Agell and Lundborg (2003) and Ekberg (2002) for Sweden,
Kimura and Ueda (2001) for Japan, Smith (2000), Elsby (2004) and Nickell and Quintini (2003)
for the UK, and Bewley (1999), Altonji and Devereux (2000) and Lebow et al. (2003) for the
US (the latter four papers also discuss previous empirical ﬁndings for the UK and the US). A
preliminary multi-country study based on the European Community Household Panel is Dessy
(2002). In general these studies document that nominal wages are rigid downwards. More spe-
ciﬁcally, the studies generally ﬁnd (i) a spike in the distribution of nominal wage changes at zero
and (ii) that the rate of inﬂation aects the distribution of nominal wage changes, both features
indicating DNWR, With the exception of Dessy (2002), dierent methods and data in the above-
mentioned studies make it in general dicult to compare the degree of downward nominal wage
4rigidity across countries.
3 Empirical approach
We use an unbalanced panel data of industry level annual wage growth from the manufacturing,
mining and quarrying, electricity, gas and water supply, and construction sectors of 14 European
countries in the period 1973–1999. The data source for wages are harmonized hourly earnings
from Eurostat. The countries included in the sample are Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain,
Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and the
UK. The observational unit is thus denoted Éwjit where j is index for industry, i is index for
country and t is index for year. There are all together S = 5814 observations distributed across
N = 288 country-year samples, on average 20 industries per country-year. More details on data
are provided in the appendix.
Before proceeding, let us ﬁrst note that an observation of a nominal wage cut in our data
diers in several respect from an observation of a nominal wage cut in most studies based on
micro data. In micro studies, a nominal wage cut is usually understood as a reduction in hourly
nominal pay for a job stayer. In our data, covering average hourly earnings for manual workers
in an industry, a wage cut might be caused by a reduction in average hourly pay for job stayers,
but it might also be caused by changes in the composition of the workers, within ﬁrms or between
ﬁrms. Thus, our data involves considerable ‘noise’ relative to observations at the individual level,
so we are unlikely to uncover all the rigidity that may exist at the individual level. On the other
hand, precisely because our data also captures other ‘avenues’ for ﬂexibility, it may yield a better
measure of rigidity at industry level.
There are no nominal wage cuts in 210 (73%) of the country-year samples. In our data
we observe, however, no less than 206 events of nominal wage reductions, i.e., 3.54% of all
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Figure 1: The number of wage cuts over time.
vary over time. There were fewer wage cuts in the 1970s and early 1980s and most wage cuts
occured after 1993. The latter half of the 1980s also saw a rise in the number of wage cuts. Table
A1 in the Data Appendix reports the distribution of wage cuts and observations across countries
and years.
The existence of nominal wage cuts implies that DNWR is certainly not absolute, but it does
not necessarily imply that wages are fully ﬂexible; DNWR may prevent nominal wage cuts in
some but not all circumstances. In Figure 2 we illustrate some country-year samples by displaying
box plots of annual wage growth in Germany and the UK. We see from the ﬁgure that the average
and the dispersion of wage growth vary over time between and within countries. The graphs
reﬂect that wage cuts are rare, but it is not possible to visually detect DNWR from the graphs
alone. To detect DNWR, we need to use a formal statistical method.
To this end, let us ﬁrst deﬁne the notional wage change as the wage change that would prevail
under no DNWR, following the terminology of Akerlof et al. (1996). In country-year samples
where there is no eect from DNWR, the notional and observed (or empirical) wage changes
will by deﬁnition be identical. However, in country-year samples where DNWR is binding, the
notional and empirical wage changes will dier, as some observations of empirical wage changes









































































Figure 2: Box plots of annual wage growth at industry level in Germany and the UK. The box plot illustrates the
distribution of wage changes within a country-year. The box extends from the 25th to the 75th percentile with the median
inside the box. The whiskers emerging from the box indicate the tails of the distributions and the crosses represent outliers.
country-year samples, the distribution of empirical wage changes will be compressed from below,
reducing the number of negative changes.
To detect whether the empirical distribution is compressed relative to the notional, we must
obtain an estimate for the notional distribution, as well as compare the notional distributions
with the empirical outcomes. We estimate the form of the notional distribution on the basis
of all country-year samples, assuming the same form in all country-years, except that we allow
for the median and dispersion to dier across country-year samples. This estimate based on all
country-year samples may also be aected by DNWR, but less so than the distribution from one
country-year sample, as the majority of the country-year samples relate to high-inﬂation time
periods for which any DNWR is unlikely to be binding. Alternatively, we could have assumed
that the notional distribution was normal, however, as illustrated in Figure 3 below, this would
not be a good approximation.
To compare the notional distributions with the empirical outcomes, we simulate all country-
year samples based on the notional distributions, and count the number of wage cuts in the
simulations. If the empirical outcomes were aected by DNWR, the simulations based on the
notional distributions will involve a higher number of wage cuts than what actually took place. If
7the dierence between the simulated number of wage cuts, based on the notional distributions,
and the actual number of wage cuts, is suciently large (which will be made more precise below),
we conclude that DNWR has been binding in some country-year samples. In the next section,
our test is presented more formally.
3.1 The formal test
To derive a distribution of notional wage changes, we exploit information from all country-year
samples. As argued above, we have to make some assumptions on the form of the distribution of
the nominal wage changes to be able to proceed. The box-plots in Figure 2 make clear that both
the median and the dispersion of the wage changes vary over time and between countries. Thus
we assume
Assumption 1 The distribution of nominal wage changes (Éwjit) is the same for all country-year samples,
adjusted linearly for country-year speciﬁc median (
0




We represent the ﬁrst and second order moments by the median and the inter quartile range
(i.e. the distance between the 25th and 75th percentiles) because country-year samples are small,
and the main alternatives, the mean and standard deviation, are less robust to outliers.1
Assumption 1 is not innocuous. But other tests often make stronger assumptions; for instance
the Kahn test (Kahn, 1997) allows for variation over time in the mean nominal wage change, but
not for variation in the dispersion. In regression based tests, signiﬁcance levels are often based
an assumption of normality, while no such assumption is necessary here.
Our null hypothesis is
H0: There is no downward nominal wage rigidity.
1We also experimented with alternative measures like the distance between the 35th and the 75th percentiles, the
median deviation form the median (MAD) and the mean deviation from the mean (MM). The correlation coecient
between the IQR and the standard deviation is 0.66, while the correlation coecient between the other measures were
























Figure 3: The normalised underlying distribution of wage growth compared to a normal distribution. 38 extreme obser-
vations are omitted.
Under H0, the empirical and the notional wage changes are identical, so that the distribution
of the notional wage changes can be derived from the empirical wage changes. Employing
Assumption 1 allows us to combine the observations from all country-year samples to a common
underlying distribution. Speciﬁcally, we obtain a sample of 5814 observations of normalised
wage changes by adjusting the empirical wage changes for the country-year speciﬁc median and
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For simplicity we use subscript s which runs over all j, i and t. The frequency distribution and
the moments of the normalised distribution are illustrated in Figure 3. The ﬁgure compares the
underlying distribution with the standard normal distribution. We notice that the underlying
distribution is skewed with the mean at 5 percent.2
The next step is to calculate the country-year speciﬁc samples of notional wage changes by
adjusting the normalised notional normalised wage changes, Éwn
s , with the country-year median
and inter quartile range, and compare them with the empirical country-year samples. However,
2We also tried country-speciﬁc normalised distributions, as well as only using observations from the high-inﬂation
years (1973–89) (which should be less aected by DNWR), but this had little impact on the qualititative results.
9as the empirical samples, as well as the moments based on them, are stochastic and thus burdened
with unknown uncertainty, we use a bootstrap method. More speciﬁcally, for each of the 288
country-year samples, we bootstrap the empirical country-year sample (for example, in a country-
year with 24 industries, we make 24 random draws from the empirical sample of 24 industry wage
changes, with replacement). Then we
• count the number of bootstrapped wage cuts in the country-year, yB
it,
• calculate country-speciﬁc bootstrapped median, 
0B
it , and inter quartile range, IQRB
it,










; s = 1;:::;5814 (2)
• calculate the corresponding country-year speciﬁc probabilities of a notional wage cut in





; s = 1;:::;5814 (3)
• simulate the number of wage cuts in each country-year speciﬁc notional sample, b yit, by
drawing from a binomial distribution using the country-speciﬁc notional probabilities ˜ qit,
and
• compare the total number of bootstrapped wage cuts Y B =
P
it yit for all 288 country-year
samples with the total number of simulated notional wage cuts, b Y =
P
it b yit .
If the empirical samples are aected by DNWR, there will be a tendency that there are more
simulated wage cuts than bootstrapped wage cuts, i.e. b Y > Y B. We repeat this procedure

































0 .02 .04 .06 .08 .1
Wage growth
Figure 4: Empirical (histograms) and notional (lines) distributions for Portugal (1997) and Germany (1980)
number of times where b Y > Y B. The null hypothesis is rejected with a level of signiﬁcance at 5%
if 1   #(b Y > Y B)=5000  0:05.
Before we turn to the results, let us make two brief comments as to the method. As noted
above, if DNWR is at work in some country-year samples, the empirical wage distribution will
be compressed, and so will our estimate of the notional wage changes, as it is based on the
empirical distributions for all country-year samples. Thus, notional probabilities will also be
biased downwards, reducing the number of simulated wage cuts, which will reduce the power of
our test. Under H0, however, there is no DNWR, and therefore no compression. Thus, under
H0, the notional probabilities are unbiased, so this feature will not aect the signiﬁcance level of
our test.
Samples of the empirical and notional wage changes for two country-years are compared in
Figure 4 (these ﬁgures are based on the empirical country-year samples without bootstrap). The
empirical histograms represents typically only 20 observations while there are 5814 observations
behind the notional ones (for the latter, we use kernel densities based on the Epanechnikov
function). We see in the left diagram that the notional distribution have a positive mass below
zero while there were no observed wage cuts, consistent with the hypothesis that downward
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Figure 5: The frequency distributions of the number of 5000 bootstrapped (empirical) and simulated (notional) wage
cuts.
samples. The right panel illustrate a country-year where the distributions of both observed and
notional wage growth are entirely above zero.
4 Results
In 4995 of 5000 simulations, there are more simulated than bootstrapped wage cuts. Thus we
reject the null hypothesis comfortably with a p-value of 0.001, and we may conclude that DNWR
has been at work in our sample. To illustrate the power of the test we plot the histogram of
the number of simulated and bootstrapped wage cuts in Figure 5. On average, we simulate 265
notional wage cuts and bootstrap 206 wage cuts (due to the large number of simulations, the
bootstrapped average of 206 clearly equals the number of observed wage cuts). The average
fraction of notional wage cuts that do not result in an observed wage cut due to DNWR, may
be expressed by (1   Y=b Y) where Y is the number of observed wage cuts and b Y is the average
number of simulated cuts. For the whole sample this fraction is (1   206=265) = 0:22. Thus, a
bit more than one out of ﬁve notional wage cuts does not result in an observed wage cut due
to DNWR. Another measure which illustrates the economic signiﬁcance of DNWR is the average
fraction of industries aected by DNWR. This fraction may be calculated by (b Y   Y)=S where S
12is the number of industries. For the whole sample this fraction is (265   206=5814) = 0:010.
Given the evidence of DNWR, it is clear that our method of estimating the notional wage
changes based on all wage observations, including those aected by DNWR, implies that also
the notional wage distribution is aected by DNWR. This causes the notional probabilities to
be biased downwards, implying that the numbers above for the wage cuts prevented and for
industries aected by DNWR, will also be biased downwards. The bias is reﬂected in the skewness
present in the underlying distribution of wage growth shown in Figure 3. To circumvent this
bias, we in the sequel follow Card and Hyslop (1997) by assuming that the distribution of wage
changes is symmetric in the absence of DNWR (in Appendix B, we include results without the
symmetry assumption). Speciﬁcally, we assume that DNWR aects the lower half of the notional
distribution while the upper half is unaected. As pointed out by Card and Hyslop (1997), most
conventional models of wage determination imply symmetry. Furthermore, it can be shown that
if the distribution of relative wages is stationary, then the distribution of changes is symmetric.
On the other hand, Elsby (2004) shows that DNWR is likely to aect also the upper tail of the
distribution, as wage setters may set lower wage increases in years where DNWR does not bind,
to reduce the risk that DNWR will bind in the future. However, as the upper tail is less aected by
DNWR than the lower tail, and in any case the normalised distribution is based on many years for
which inﬂation is too high for DNWR to be an important problem, we don’t think this is critical.
To obtain a normalised and symmetric distribution of notional wage changes, we choose
observations greater than median of the underlying distribution in Figure 3 and ﬂip them around
the median. From this distribution we obtain bias adjusted notional wage growth distributions
and corresponding bias adjusted notional probabilities. Otherwise, the method is as described
above. As expected, the average number of simulated wage cuts (295) are somewhat higher using
the bias-adjusted probabilities, implying that the fraction of wage cuts prevented for the entire
sample increases from 0.22 to 0.30, cf. column 1 in Table 2.
13Table 1: Results from 5000 simulations on subperiods using bias adjusted probabilities.
Sample properties: 1973–1979 1980–1989 1990–1994 1995–1999
No. of observations 1326 2180 1200 1108
No. of country-years 67 113 56 52
Average wage growth 14.99% 9.27% 6.68% 4.38%
Average inﬂation rate 10.68% 8.69% 4.99% 2.37%
Average unemployment rate 3.80% 8.71% 9.03% 9.21%
Observed wage cuts (Y) 5 55 42 104
Proportion of wage cuts (%) 0.38 2.52 3.50 9.39
Simulation results:
Average simulated wage cuts 17 84 62 131
#(b Y > Y B) 4985 4983 4939 4929
Probability of signiﬁcance 0.003 0.003 0.012 0.014
Fraction of wage cuts prevented 0.706 0.345 0.323 0.206
Fraction of industries aected 0.009 0.013 0.017 0.024
A number of interesting questions arise. Is there evidence for DNWR for dierent time peri-
ods, regions and countries? To what extent is DNWR related to labour market institutions as
proposed by theory? We ﬁrst investigate whether DNWR has changed over time by splitting the
sample into four subperiods 1973–1979, 1980–1989, 1990–1994 and 1995–1999, see Table 1.
There is evidence of DNWR in all periods. In the high-inﬂation 1970s, on average 70 percent
of the notional wage cuts did not result in observed wage cuts. In the 1980s and early 1990s,
more than 30 percent of the notional wage cuts did not result in observed wage cuts, while in
the late 1990s, the probability that DNWR prevented a notional wage cut leading to an observed
wage cut was 20 percent. While the results indicate that the fraction of wage cuts prevented by
DNWR decreased over time, the average fraction of industries aected by DNWR increased from
0.9 percent in the 1970s to 1.3 percent in the 1980s, 1.7 percent in the early 1990s and ﬁnally 2.4
percent in the late 1990s.
Nominal rigidities may also be related to labour market institutions. Based on a theoretical
framework allowing for bargaining over collective agreements as well as individual bargaining,
Holden (2004) argues that workers who have their wage set via unions or collective agreements
14Table 2: Results from 5000 simulations on regions using bias adjusted probabilities.
Sample properties: All regions British Isles and Denmark Core South
No. of observations 5814 1565 2697 1473
No. of country-years 288 74 132 75
Observed wage cuts (Y) 206 53 122 29
Proportion of wage cuts (%) 3.54 3.39 4.52 1.97
Simulation results:
Average simulated wage cuts 295 76 160 55
#(b Y > Y B) 5000 4934 4993 4994
Probability of signiﬁcance 0 0.013 0.001 0.001
Fraction of wage cuts prevented 0.302 0.303 0.238 0.473
Fraction of industries aected 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.018
have stronger protection against a nominal wage cut, thus the extent of DNWR is likely to de-
pend on the coverage of collective agreements and union density. For non-union workers, the
strictness of the employment protection legislation (EPL) is key to their possibility of avoiding
a nominal wage cut. As documented by among others OECD (1999), such institutions dier
considerably among European countries, and it would therefore be interesting to investigate ex-
istence of DNWR for regions as well as individual countries. We ﬁrst split the sample into regions
which have comparable labour market institutions. We operate with three regions; the British
Isles and Denmark, Core (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands), and
South (Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain).3 The results from simulations using these regions are
presented in columns 2, 3 and 4 in Table 2.
We reject the hypothesis of no DNWR for all regions. In the South, a region where bargaining
coverage is fairly high (see e.g. Calmfors et al., 2001, table 4.4) and EPL is very strict OECD
(1999), 47 percent of the notional wage cuts did not result in an observed cut, while 1.8 percent
of the industries were aected by DNWR. In the Core, where there is generally high bargaining
coverage and fairly strong EPL, 24 of the notional wage cuts did not result in observed cuts,
which is considerably lower than in the South. In the British Isles and Denmark, 30 percent
3We omit Sweden and Finland because they dier from the other countries in this respect and because of too few
observations.
15of the notitional wage cuts were prevented by DNWR. In this region, EPL is less strict than in
most of the rest of Europe; however, union density and bargaining coverage are fairly high in
Denmark and Ireland, but not in the UK. 1.4 percent of the industries were aected by DNWR
in the Core, and 1.5 percent the British Isles and Denmark.
Splitting the sample by combining the regions and the sub-periods reduces the signiﬁcance
levels, see Table 3. At ten percent level, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant DNWR in the British Isles and Den-
mark (1980s), the Core (1970s and 1980s), and in the South (all periods). For all regions, the
fraction of notional wage cuts that did not lead to observed cuts has fallen over time, consistent
with the aggregate picture as seen in Table 1. The fraction of industries aected by DNWR has
increased in all regions, the exception being the British Isles and Denmark in the late 1990s.
In Table 4, we report the results concerning individual countries. These results should be
treated more cautiously, as they are based on a smaller number of observations. Bearing this
in mind, we observe that for all countries except France, the simulations indicate that some of
the notional wage cuts do not result in observed wage cuts due to DNWR. For four countries
(Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and Portugal), DNWR is signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level,
while for Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg, we ﬁnd DNWR at ten percent level. For the other
countries, DNWR is not statistically signiﬁcant, even if the average fraction of notional wage cuts
that do not result in observed cuts for some countries is as high as 16 percent for Germany and
25 percent for the UK. This illustrates the considerable uncertainty involved in this measure.
The fraction of industries aected by DNWR varies from 5.8 (the Netherlands) and 4.5 (Portugal)
percent at the top, to 0.4 (Greece) and 0 (France) percent at the bottom.
To further explore the reliability of our measures of DNWR, we undertake Poisson regressions
with the number of observed wage cuts in each country-year sample it, Yit, as the dependent
variable, and normalise on the number of simulated wage cuts, b Yit. A Poisson regression seems
appropriate as the endogenous variable is based on count data, see Cameron and Trivedi (1998).
16Table 3: Results from 5000 simulations on regions and sub-periods using bias adjusted probabilities.
Region 1973–1979 1980–1989 1990–1994 1995–1999
No. of observations 369 644 313 239
No. of country-years 18 30 15 11
British Observed wage cuts (Y) 1 11 20 21
Isles Proportion of wage cuts (%) 0.27 1.71 6.39 8.79
and Average simulated wage cuts 4 20 27 25
Denmark #(b Y > Y B) 4330 4711 4347 3627
Probability of signiﬁcance 0.134 0.058 0.131 0.275
Fraction of wage cuts prevented 0.750 0.450 0.259 0.160
Fraction of industries aected 0.008 0.014 0.022 0.017
No. of observations 698 1023 506 470
No. of country-years 35 50 25 22
Observed wage cuts (Y) 4 39 17 62
Core Proportion of wage cuts (%) 0.57 3.81 3.36 13.19
Average simulated wage cuts 11 54 24 71
#(b Y > Y B) 4760 4777 4398 4344
Probability of signiﬁcance 0.048 0.045 0.120 0.131
Fraction of wage cuts prevented 0.636 0.278 0.292 0.127
Fraction of industries aected 0.010 0.015 0.014 0.019
No. of observations 259 513 366 335
No. of country-years 14 33 15 13
Observed wage cuts (Y) 0 5 4 20
South Proportion of wage cuts (%) 0 0.97 1.09 5.97
Average simulated wage cuts 3 11 11 31
#(b Y > Y B) 4613 4629 4780 4740
Probability of signiﬁcance 0.077 0.074 0.044 0.052
Fraction of wage cuts prevented 1 0.545 0.636 0.355
Fraction of industries aected 0.012 0.012 0.019 0.054
Adding dummys for region, period, combined region and period, as well as for countries, we
are then able to derive conﬁdence intervals for the fraction of wage cuts prevented for all the re-
spective subsamples, see Figure 6. Note that the point estimates of the fractions in Figure 6 dier
slightly from the fractions in the tables, as the former are based on the Poisson regressions, and
thus are non-linear, while the latter are linear averages based on the simulations. The conﬁdence
intervals are fairly large, and with few exceptions, we are not able to conclude that the fractions
are signiﬁcantly dierent from one another.
However, we also undertake a Poisson regression of Yit, as the dependent variable, normal-
17Table 4: Results from 5000 simulations on countries using bias adjusted probabilities.
Country No. of observations
No. of years
Observed wage cuts (Y)
Prop. of wage cuts (%)





Fraction of wage cuts prevented
Fraction of industries aected
Belgium 575 26 31 5.39 42 4787 0.043 0.262 0.019
Denmark 485 25 8 1.65 14 4507 0.099 0.429 0.012
France 554 26 21 3.79 21 2329 0.534 0 0
Germany 665 26 16 2.41 19 3331 0.334 0.158 0.005
Greece 472 26 7 1.48 9 3099 0.380 0.222 0.004
Ireland 462 23 27 5.84 38 4632 0.074 0.289 0.024
Italy 312 13 0 0 4 4864 0.027 1 0.013
Luxembourg420 27 31 7.38 41 4617 0.077 0.244 0.024
Netherlands 431 27 12 2.78 37 4918 0.016 0.676 0.058
Portugal 401 18 2 0.50 20 4999 0.000 0.900 0.045
Spain 288 18 20 6.94 22 3091 0.382 0.091 0.007
UK 615 26 18 2.93 24 4184 0.163 0.250 0.010
ising on b Yit, and adding a time trend. The estimated trend coecient is  0:035 and is signiﬁcantly
negative at the one percent level, implying that we can conclude that DNWR as measured by the
fraction of wage cuts prevented, has fallen over time. Furthermore, we also regress the country-
year observations of the fraction of industries aected, (b Yit   Yit)=Sit on a time trend (now using
OLS, as a Poisson regression is not feasible when some observations are negative). We ﬁnd a
trend coecient of 0:00066, which is signiﬁcantly positive at the one percent level, implying that
the number of industries aected by DNWR has increased over time.
5 Explaining the number of wage cuts
While the previous analysis documents the existence of DNWR, it does not shed light on to what
extent the incidence of nominal wage cuts depends on economic and institutional variables.
Treating the number of wage cuts in each country-year sample as one observation, we have 288
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Figure 6: Estimated fractions of wage cuts prevented with 95% conﬁdence intervals.
to depend on inﬂation in a non-linear way, as well as on institutional variables like EPL and union
density/bargaining coverage. Furthermore, high unemployment may also weaken workers’ res-
istance to nominal wage cuts. Thus, we apply a Poisson regression model of the number of wage
cuts in each country-year sample, with a number of explanatory variables including inﬂation and
inﬂation squared, an index of EPL, union density, the unemployment rate, as well as an interac-
tion between EPL and inﬂation.4 We do the analysis in two dierent ways. First, we normalise
on the number of industries in the country-year sample, Sit, i.e. we explain the incidence of
wage cuts. Second, we normalise on the number of simulated wage cuts, b Yit, i.e. we explain the
fraction of wage cuts prevented. Adding institutional variables as regressors, we can then test
4Regrettably, the data for union density and bargaining coverage apply to the whole economy, and not to the
industry sector. As variation in density or coverage in other parts of the economy would aect the density/coverage
variable, but presumably not aect wage setting in the industry sector, the estimates of these variables might be biased
downwards. See further details in the Data Appendix.
19directly whether these variables lead to fewer observed that notional wage cuts, i.e. to DNWR.
The conditional density in a Poisson model is






where E(Yit j xit) = it, and
lnit = x0
it (5)
where xit represents the explanatory variables and  is the parameter vector. In the Poisson
model the variance is equal to the mean. However, data are often characterised by ‘overdisper-
sion’ and hence at odds with the Poisson assumption. Undertaking the Poisson regression of
Yit=Sit, a goodness-of ﬁt test formally rejects the hypothesis that the data are generated according
to the Poisson regression model (2(254) = 389:6). We therefore use a negative binomial regres-
sion model, which allows for overdispersion and can be seen as a generalisation of the Poisson
model. Speciﬁcally, we use two alternative speciﬁcations for the Poisson parameter:
lnit = x0
it + "it; "it  È(1;) (5’)
lnit = x0
it + "it; "it  È(1;ie i) (5”)
Including a Gamma distributed error term, "it, in (5’) and (5”) allows the variance to mean ratios
of Yit to be larger than unity. (4) and (5’) yield the pooled negative binomial regression model.
In (5”), we also include a country speciﬁc ﬁxed eect, i, to allow for a country speciﬁc variance
to mean ratio, see Hausman et al. (1984) for details.
The results of the negative binomial model are presented in the ﬁrst two columns of Table
5. In accordance with the theoretical predictions, EPL, union density and inﬂation, all have a
signiﬁcant negative eect on the incidence of nominal wage cuts, although in the ﬁxed eects
model, union density is only signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level. High unemployment reduces the
20Table 5: Maximum likelihood estimates with standard errors in parenthesis.
Negative binomial Poisson
Pooled Fixed eects Pooled Fixed eects
Ln(Sit) 1 (—) 1 (–) – –
Ln(Simulated cuts) — – 1 (–) 1 (–)
EPL  0:745 (0:277)  0:969 (0:367)  0:307 (0:133)  0:767 (0:335)
Union density  1:739 (0:795)  2:210 (1:299)  1:072 (0:514)  5:843 (3:118)
Inﬂation  0:773 (0:168)  0:609 (0:157)  0:246 (0:097)  0:250 (0:132)
Inﬂation squared 0:012 (0:005) 0:004 (0:005) 0:003 (0:003)  0:089 (0:424)
Unemployment 0:074 (0:032) 0:104 (0:043) 0:028 (0:017) 0:039 (0:044)
EPL  inﬂation 0:111 (0:057) 0:130 (0:062) 0:041 (0:032) 7:582 (4:615)
constant  0:076 (0:927)  1:041 (1:319) 0:827 (0:471) —
log-likelihood –218.9 –182.7 –151.3 –116.9
Number of observations 261 246 261 246
Notes: (i) Sit is the number of industries in country-year sample it. (ii)  indicates signiﬁcance at 5% level. (iii)
Luxembourg is not included because of lack of EPL data. In addition, Finland and Italy are excluded from the ﬁxed
eects models as there are no observed wage cuts in these countries.
incidence of wage cuts. The interaction between EPL and inﬂation is signiﬁcantly positive in the
ﬁxed eects model, reﬂecting that the negative eect of EPL on the incidence of wage cuts do
not apply in high-inﬂation periods, when wage cuts are rare irrespective of EPL. We also tried to
include bargaining coverage, an index of temporary employment and the interaction of inﬂation
and union density in the ﬁxed eects model. They all entered with the expected sign, but they
were jointly insigniﬁcant with a 2(3) = 2:37.
We then investigate whether institutions aect the extent of DNWR as measured by the av-
erage fraction of wage cuts prevented (1   Y=b Y), by a Poisson regression of Yit normalised on
the number of simulated wage cuts b Yit. The results are presented in columns 3 (pooled) and 4
(ﬁxed eects) of Table 5. Note that in this case the restriction imposed by the Poisson regression
relative to the negative binomial regression is accepted easily; indeed the results are the same in
the negative binomial model for both speciﬁcations.5 Again, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative eect
on the number of wage cuts, implying a positive eect of EPL and union density on the fraction
of wage cuts prevented. Also, there is a positive eect of inﬂation, which implies that there are
5The goodness-of-ﬁt test yields 2(254) = 133:0.
21fewer wage cuts prevented when inﬂation is lower. In the ﬁxed eects model, union density and
inﬂation are only signiﬁcant at the ten percent level. We also tried to include bargaining cover-
age, an index of temporary employment and the interaction of inﬂation and union density in the
ﬁxed eects model. They all entered with the expected sign, but they were jointly insigniﬁcant
with a 2(3) = 1:37.
6 Conclusions
This paper explores the existence of downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) in the manu-
facturing, mining and quarrying, electricity, gas and water supply, and construction sectors of
14 European countries, over the period 1973–1999, using a data set of hourly nominal wages
at industry level. Based on a novel nonparametric statistical method, which allows for country
and year speciﬁc variation in both the median and the dispersion of industry wage changes, we
reject the hypothesis of no DNWR for the total sample. Splitting into subsamples, we document
the existence of DNWR for the high inﬂation period 1973–1989, as well as for the low inﬂation
periods 1990–1994 and 1995–1999. Furthermore, we also ﬁnd evidence for DNWR for groups
of countries: the South (Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain), the Core (Belgium, France, Germany,
Luxembourg, Netherlands), and the British Isles and Denmark. Dividing further into individual
countries, the results indicate that, for all countries except France, some of the notional wage cuts
do not lead to observered wage cuts due to DNWR. However, DNWR is statistically signiﬁcant
only for some of the countries: for Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and Portugal at ﬁve percent
level, and Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg at ten percent level.
Interestingly, our results show that the fraction of notional wage cuts that do not result in
observed wage cuts has fallen over time, for all the groups of countries we consider. The simula-
tions indicate that for all countries together, the fraction of wage cuts prevented has fallen from
70 percent in the 1970s to 20 percent in the late 1990s. On the other hand, as the inﬂation has
22fallen over time, the fraction of industries aected by DNWR has increased from less than 0.9
percent in the 1970s, to 2.4 percent in the late 1990s.
We then proceed to explore whether the incidence of nominal wage cuts can be explained
by economic and institutional variables. Treating the incidence of nominal wage cuts in each
country-year sample as one observation, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant negative eect of inﬂation, the strict-
ness of employment protection legislation and of union density. We also ﬁnd that inﬂation, the
strictness of employment protection legislation and union density have signiﬁcant positive im-
pact on our measure of DNWR: in country-year samples with high inﬂation, strict employment
protection legislation and high union density, the number of observed wage cuts is signiﬁcantly
reduced relative to the number of simulated, notional wage cuts.
Our study should be seen as complementary to the increasing number of empirical studies
on the existence of DNWR based in individual data. Compared to these studies, our approach
has the advantage that it focusses on industry level eects, and thus is not subject to the critique
that signiﬁcant DNWR at individual or ﬁrm level might be circumvented by employment being
shifted over from high-wage to low-wage jobs. In comparison, Card and Hyslop (1997) ﬁnd
evidence of DNWR on US microdata, but inconclusive evidence for state level data. On the
other hand, as we (obviously) have much fewer observations than most micro-studies, and use
weak assumptions – no functional form assumption, and allowing for time and country variation
in the median and dispersion of wage changes – our test presumably has lower power. Indeed,
Knoppik and Beissinger (2003) ﬁnd signiﬁcant DNWR for Germany, while we do not.
We are reluctant to draw strong policy conclusions from our study. Overall in our sample,
DNWR is signiﬁcant but of moderate size. Labour markets appear to adapt to lower inﬂation,
as the fraction of wage cuts prevented by DNWR has fallen over time. Yet the fraction of total
industries that have been aected by DNWR has increased over time, suggesting that the overall
eect on DNWR of a more determined eort towards low inﬂation, as the monetary policy of the
23ECB arguably implies, are uncertain.
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A Data appendix
We have obtained our wage data from Eurostat. The precise source is Table HMWHOUR in the
Harmonized earnings domain of under the Population and Social Conditions theme in the NEWCRO-
NOS database. Our wage variable (HMWHOUR) is labelled Gross hourly earnings of manual workers
in industry. Gross earnings cover remuneration in cash paid directly and regularly by the em-
ployer at the time of each wage payment, before tax deductions and social security contributions
payable by wage earners and retained by the employer. Payments for leave, public holidays, and
other paid individual absences, are included in principle, in so far as the corresponding days or
hours are also taken into account to calculate earnings per unit of time. The weekly hours of
work are those in a normal week’s work (i.e. not including public holidays) during the reference
period. These hours are calculated on the basis of the number of hours paid, including over-
time hours paid. Furthermore, we use data in national currency and males and females are both
included in the data. The data for Germany does not include GDR before 1990 or new L ¨ ander.
The data are recorded by classiﬁcation of economic activities (NACE Rev. 1). The sections
represented are Mining and quarrying (C), Manufacturing (D), Electricity, gas and water supply
(E) and Construction (F). We use data on various levels of aggregation from the section levels
(e.g. D Manufacturing) to group levels (e.g. DA 159 Manufacturing of beverages), however,
using the most disaggregate level available in order to maximize the number of observations. If
for example, wage data are available for D, DA 158 and DA 159, we use the latter two only to
avoid counting the same observations twice.
The average number of observations per country-year sample is 20.5, with a standard error
of 4.7. The distribution of the number of wage cuts relative to the number of observations on
years and countries are reported in Table A1.
26Data for inﬂation and unemployment are from the OECD Economic Outlook database.
The primary sources for the employment protection legislation index, which is displayed in
Table A2, are Lazear (1990) for the period 1973–79 and OECD (1999) for the remaining years.
We follow the same procedure as Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) to construct time-varying series
which is to use the OECD summary measure in the ‘Late 1980s’ for 1980–89 and the ‘Late 1990s’
for 1995–99. For 1990-94 we interpolate the series, and use the percentage change in Lazear’s
index to back-cast the OECD measure. However, we are not able to reconstruct the Blanchard
and Wolfers data exactly.
Data for union density until 1995 is from Nickell et al. (2002, Table 5). For the remaining
years we interpolate using observations for 2001 from EIRO (2003, Table 9). Data for Greece
(1985 and 1995), Ireland (1985 and 1993) and Luxembourg (1987 and 1995) are from ILO (1997,
Table 1.2). Data for intervening years are produced by interpolation, while we extrapolate before
1985(87) and after 1993(95).
Data for bargaining coverage until 1994 are from Nickell et al. (2002, Table 4), which provide
data with ﬁve year intervals. Yearly data are calculated by interpolation. EIRO (2003, Table
1) presents data for 2000 (1999 for Portugal and 2001 for the Netherlands) which allows us to
interpolate for the late 1990s. Data for Greece and Ireland are only available for 1994 from ILO
(1997, Table 1.2).
Data for the incidence of temporary employment is from Young (2003, Table 4.1), which
provides observations with ﬁve year intervals from 1985–2000. We interpolate to obtain yearly



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































28Table A2: Indices for employment protection legislation
Year BE DE DK ES FI FR GR IE IT NL PT SW UK
1973 3.10 3.20 2.10 3.89 2.30 2.44 3.60 0.76 4.10 2.70 3.16 2.57 0.46
1974 3.10 3.20 2.10 3.89 2.30 2.57 3.60 0.83 4.10 2.70 3.42 3.03 0.48
1975 3.10 3.20 2.10 3.89 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 4.10 2.70 3.67 3.50 0.50
1976 3.10 3.20 2.10 3.86 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 4.10 2.70 3.75 3.50 0.50
1977 3.10 3.20 2.10 3.82 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 4.10 2.70 3.83 3.50 0.50
1978 3.10 3.20 2.10 3.78 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 4.10 2.70 3.92 3.50 0.50
1979 3.10 3.20 2.10 3.74 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 4.10 2.70 4.00 3.50 0.50
1980 3.10 3.20 2.10 3.70 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 4.10 2.70 4.10 3.50 0.50
1981 3.10 3.20 2.10 3.70 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 4.10 2.70 4.10 3.50 0.50
1982 3.10 3.20 2.10 3.70 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 4.10 2.70 4.10 3.50 0.50
1983 3.10 3.20 2.10 3.70 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 4.10 2.70 4.10 3.50 0.50
1984 3.10 3.20 2.10 3.70 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 4.10 2.70 4.10 3.50 0.50
1985 3.10 3.20 2.10 3.70 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 4.10 2.70 4.10 3.50 0.50
1986 3.10 3.20 2.10 3.70 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 4.10 2.70 4.10 3.50 0.50
1987 3.10 3.20 2.10 3.70 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 4.10 2.70 4.10 3.50 0.50
1988 3.10 3.20 2.10 3.70 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 4.10 2.70 4.10 3.50 0.50
1989 3.10 3.20 2.10 3.70 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 4.10 2.70 4.10 3.50 0.50
1990 2.93 3.08 1.95 3.60 2.25 2.75 3.60 0.90 3.97 2.60 4.03 3.28 0.50
1991 2.77 2.97 1.80 3.50 2.20 2.80 3.60 0.90 3.83 2.50 3.97 3.07 0.50
1992 2.60 2.85 1.65 3.40 2.15 2.85 3.60 0.90 3.70 2.40 3.90 2.85 0.50
1993 2.43 2.73 1.50 3.30 2.10 2.90 3.60 0.90 3.57 2.30 3.83 2.63 0.50
1994 2.27 2.62 1.35 3.20 2.05 2.95 3.60 0.90 3.43 2.20 3.77 2.42 0.50
1995 2.10 2.50 1.20 3.10 2.00 3.00 3.60 0.90 3.30 2.10 3.70 2.20 0.50
1996 2.10 2.50 1.20 3.10 2.00 3.00 3.60 0.90 3.30 2.10 3.70 2.20 0.50
1997 2.10 2.50 1.20 3.10 2.00 3.00 3.60 0.90 3.30 2.10 3.70 2.20 0.50
1998 2.10 2.50 1.20 3.10 2.00 3.00 3.60 0.90 3.30 2.10 3.70 2.20 0.50
1999 2.10 2.50 1.20 3.10 2.00 3.00 3.60 0.90 3.30 2.10 3.70 2.20 0.50
Table A3: Indices for union denisty
Year BE DE DK ES FI FR GR IE IT LU NL PT SW UK
1973 0.48 0.32 0.62 0.09 0.61 0.22 0.37 0.53 0.43 0.53 0.36 0.61 0.72 0.50
1974 0.49 0.34 0.65 0.09 0.63 0.22 0.37 0.54 0.46 0.53 0.36 0.61 0.73 0.52
1975 0.52 0.35 0.69 0.09 0.65 0.22 0.37 0.56 0.48 0.53 0.38 0.61 0.74 0.54
1976 0.53 0.35 0.73 0.09 0.68 0.21 0.37 0.57 0.50 0.53 0.37 0.61 0.75 0.55
1977 0.54 0.35 0.74 0.09 0.66 0.21 0.37 0.57 0.50 0.53 0.37 0.61 0.78 0.57
1978 0.53 0.35 0.78 0.09 0.67 0.21 0.37 0.58 0.50 0.53 0.37 0.61 0.79 0.57
1979 0.54 0.35 0.77 0.09 0.68 0.19 0.37 0.58 0.50 0.53 0.37 0.61 0.80 0.57
1980 0.53 0.35 0.79 0.09 0.69 0.19 0.37 0.57 0.50 0.53 0.35 0.61 0.80 0.56
1981 0.53 0.35 0.80 0.09 0.68 0.18 0.37 0.57 0.48 0.53 0.33 0.61 0.81 0.55
1982 0.52 0.35 0.80 0.10 0.68 0.17 0.37 0.56 0.47 0.53 0.32 0.61 0.82 0.54
1983 0.52 0.35 0.81 0.10 0.69 0.16 0.37 0.57 0.46 0.53 0.31 0.61 0.83 0.53
1984 0.52 0.34 0.79 0.12 0.69 0.15 0.37 0.57 0.45 0.53 0.29 0.61 0.84 0.53
1985 0.51 0.34 0.78 0.12 0.69 0.14 0.37 0.56 0.43 0.53 0.28 0.56 0.84 0.51
1986 0.49 0.34 0.77 0.12 0.70 0.13 0.35 0.53 0.41 0.53 0.27 0.51 0.84 0.50
1987 0.49 0.33 0.75 0.12 0.71 0.12 0.34 0.51 0.41 0.53 0.24 0.46 0.84 0.49
1988 0.48 0.33 0.74 0.13 0.72 0.12 0.33 0.52 0.41 0.52 0.24 0.41 0.82 0.47
1989 0.49 0.33 0.76 0.13 0.73 0.11 0.32 0.53 0.40 0.51 0.24 0.37 0.82 0.45
1990 0.50 0.32 0.75 0.14 0.73 0.10 0.31 0.52 0.40 0.49 0.24 0.32 0.80 0.44
1991 0.52 0.33 0.76 0.16 0.75 0.10 0.29 0.53 0.40 0.48 0.25 0.32 0.80 0.43
1992 0.53 0.32 0.76 0.18 0.77 0.10 0.28 0.51 0.40 0.47 0.25 0.32 0.83 0.41
1993 0.54 0.30 0.77 0.20 0.79 0.10 0.27 0.50 0.40 0.46 0.24 0.32 0.86 0.40
1994 0.54 0.29 0.77 0.20 0.79 0.10 0.26 0.48 0.39 0.45 0.25 0.32 0.91 0.38
1995 0.54 0.27 0.77 0.18 0.80 0.10 0.24 0.46 0.39 0.43 0.24 0.32 0.90 0.37
1996 0.56 0.28 0.79 0.18 0.80 0.10 0.26 0.46 0.38 0.44 0.25 0.32 0.88 0.35
1997 0.59 0.28 0.81 0.17 0.79 0.10 0.27 0.46 0.38 0.46 0.25 0.31 0.86 0.34
1998 0.61 0.29 0.82 0.17 0.79 0.09 0.28 0.45 0.37 0.47 0.26 0.31 0.84 0.33
1999 0.64 0.29 0.84 0.16 0.79 0.09 0.30 0.45 0.37 0.48 0.26 0.31 0.83 0.32
29Table A4: Indices for bargaining coverage
Year BE DE DK ES FI FR GR IE IT NL PT SW UK
1973 0.83 0.90 0.69 0.65 0.95 0.80 0.90 0.90 0.86 0.70 0.64 0.73 0.70
1974 0.84 0.90 0.70 0.66 0.95 0.81 0.90 0.90 0.86 0.71 0.65 0.74 0.71
1975 0.85 0.90 0.70 0.66 0.95 0.82 0.90 0.90 0.85 0.72 0.65 0.75 0.72
1976 0.86 0.90 0.70 0.66 0.95 0.82 0.90 0.90 0.85 0.73 0.66 0.76 0.72
1977 0.87 0.90 0.71 0.67 0.95 0.83 0.90 0.90 0.85 0.74 0.67 0.76 0.71
1978 0.88 0.91 0.71 0.67 0.95 0.84 0.90 0.90 0.85 0.74 0.68 0.77 0.71
1979 0.89 0.91 0.72 0.68 0.95 0.84 0.90 0.90 0.85 0.75 0.69 0.78 0.70
1980 0.90 0.91 0.72 0.68 0.95 0.85 0.90 0.90 0.85 0.76 0.70 0.79 0.70
1981 0.90 0.91 0.72 0.68 0.95 0.86 0.90 0.90 0.85 0.77 0.71 0.79 0.69
1982 0.90 0.91 0.73 0.69 0.95 0.86 0.90 0.90 0.85 0.78 0.72 0.80 0.68
1983 0.90 0.90 0.73 0.69 0.95 0.87 0.90 0.90 0.85 0.78 0.73 0.81 0.66
1984 0.90 0.90 0.74 0.70 0.95 0.88 0.90 0.90 0.85 0.79 0.74 0.82 0.65
1985 0.90 0.90 0.74 0.70 0.95 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.82 0.64
1986 0.90 0.90 0.73 0.71 0.95 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.85 0.81 0.75 0.83 0.62
1987 0.90 0.90 0.72 0.72 0.95 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.84 0.81 0.76 0.84 0.60
1988 0.90 0.90 0.71 0.74 0.95 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.84 0.82 0.77 0.85 0.58
1989 0.90 0.90 0.70 0.75 0.95 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.83 0.82 0.78 0.85 0.56
1990 0.90 0.90 0.69 0.76 0.95 0.92 0.90 0.90 0.83 0.83 0.79 0.86 0.54
1991 0.90 0.90 0.69 0.76 0.95 0.93 0.90 0.90 0.83 0.83 0.77 0.87 0.51
1992 0.90 0.91 0.69 0.77 0.95 0.94 0.90 0.90 0.82 0.84 0.75 0.88 0.47
1993 0.90 0.92 0.69 0.77 0.95 0.94 0.90 0.90 0.82 0.84 0.73 0.88 0.44
1994 0.90 0.92 0.69 0.78 0.95 0.95 0.90 0.90 0.82 0.85 0.71 0.89 0.40
1995 0.90 0.93 0.69 0.78 0.95 0.96 0.90 0.90 0.82 0.86 0.69 0.90 0.37
1996 0.90 0.93 0.69 0.79 0.95 0.96 0.90 0.90 0.81 0.86 0.67 0.90 0.33
1997 0.90 0.94 0.69 0.79 0.95 0.97 0.90 0.90 0.81 0.87 0.65 0.91 0.29
1998 0.90 0.94 0.69 0.80 0.95 0.98 0.90 0.90 0.81 0.87 0.63 0.92 0.26
1999 0.90 0.95 0.69 0.80 0.95 0.99 0.90 0.90 0.81 0.88 0.61 0.93 0.22
Table A5: Indices for incidence of temporary employment
Year BE DE DK ES FI FR GR IE IT LU NL PT SW UK
1973 6.90 10.00 12.30 15.60 16.50 4.70 21.10 7.30 4.70 4.70 7.50 14.40 13.00 6.90
1974 6.90 10.00 12.30 15.60 16.50 4.70 21.10 7.30 4.70 4.70 7.50 14.40 13.00 6.90
1975 6.90 10.00 12.30 15.60 16.50 4.70 21.10 7.30 4.70 4.70 7.50 14.40 13.00 6.90
1976 6.90 10.00 12.30 15.60 16.50 4.70 21.10 7.30 4.70 4.70 7.50 14.40 13.00 6.90
1977 6.90 10.00 12.30 15.60 16.50 4.70 21.10 7.30 4.70 4.70 7.50 14.40 13.00 6.90
1978 6.90 10.00 12.30 15.60 16.50 4.70 21.10 7.30 4.70 4.70 7.50 14.40 13.00 6.90
1979 6.90 10.00 12.30 15.60 16.50 4.70 21.10 7.30 4.70 4.70 7.50 14.40 13.00 6.90
1980 6.90 10.00 12.30 15.60 16.50 4.70 21.10 7.30 4.70 4.70 7.50 14.40 13.00 6.90
1981 6.90 10.00 12.30 15.60 16.50 4.70 21.10 7.30 4.70 4.70 7.50 14.40 13.00 6.90
1982 6.90 10.00 12.30 15.60 16.50 4.70 21.10 7.30 4.70 4.70 7.50 14.40 13.00 6.90
1983 6.90 10.00 12.30 15.60 16.50 4.70 21.10 7.30 4.70 4.70 7.50 14.40 13.00 6.90
1984 6.90 10.00 12.30 15.60 16.50 4.70 21.10 7.30 4.70 4.70 7.50 14.40 13.00 6.90
1985 6.90 10.00 12.30 15.60 16.50 4.70 21.10 7.30 4.70 4.70 7.50 14.40 13.00 6.90
1986 6.58 10.10 12.00 15.60 16.50 5.88 20.18 7.54 4.80 4.44 7.52 14.40 13.00 6.54
1987 6.26 10.20 11.70 15.60 16.50 7.06 19.26 7.78 4.90 4.18 7.54 15.40 13.00 6.18
1988 5.94 10.30 11.40 20.37 16.50 8.24 18.34 8.02 5.00 3.92 7.56 16.40 13.00 5.82
1989 5.62 10.40 11.10 25.13 16.50 9.42 17.42 8.26 5.10 3.66 7.58 17.40 13.00 5.46
1990 5.30 10.50 10.80 29.90 16.50 10.60 16.50 8.50 5.20 3.40 7.60 18.40 13.00 5.10
1991 5.30 10.48 11.06 30.92 16.50 10.92 15.24 8.84 5.60 3.28 8.24 16.74 13.00 5.46
1992 5.30 10.46 11.32 31.94 16.50 11.24 13.98 9.18 6.00 3.15 8.88 15.08 13.00 5.82
1993 5.30 10.44 11.58 32.96 16.50 11.56 12.72 9.52 6.40 3.03 9.52 13.42 13.00 6.18
1994 5.30 10.42 11.84 33.98 16.50 11.88 11.46 9.86 6.80 2.90 10.16 11.76 13.00 6.54
1995 5.30 10.40 12.10 35.00 16.50 12.20 10.20 10.20 7.20 2.98 10.80 10.10 13.00 6.90
1996 6.04 10.88 11.72 34.44 16.74 12.84 10.78 9.34 7.78 3.07 11.40 12.16 13.26 6.84
1997 6.78 11.36 11.34 33.88 16.98 13.48 11.36 8.48 8.36 3.15 12.00 14.22 13.52 6.78
1998 7.52 11.84 10.96 33.32 17.22 14.12 11.94 7.62 8.94 3.23 12.60 16.28 13.78 6.72
1999 8.26 12.32 10.58 32.76 17.46 14.76 12.52 6.76 9.52 3.32 13.20 18.34 14.04 6.66
30B Results without bias adjustment
Table B1: Results from 5000 simulations on subperiods.
Sample properties: 1973–1979 1980–1989 1990–1994 1995–1999
No. of observations 1326 2180 1200 1108
No. of country-years 67 113 56 52
Average wage growth 14.99% 9.27% 6.68% 4.38%
Average inﬂation rate 10.68% 8.69% 4.99% 2.37%
Average unemployment rate 3.80% 8.71% 9.03% 9.21%
Observed wage cuts (Y) 5 55 42 104
Proportion of wage cuts (%) 0.38 2.52 3.50 9.39
Simulation results:
Average simulated wage cuts 13 74 56 122
#(b Y > Y B) 4765 4765 4679 4659
Probability of signiﬁcance 0.047 0.047 0.064 0.068
Fraction of wage cuts prevented 0.615 0.257 0.250 0.148
Fraction of industries aected 0.006 0.009 0.012 0.016
Table B2: Results from 5000 simulations on regions.
Sample properties: All regions British Isles and Denmark Core South
No. of observations 5814 1565 2697 1473
No. of country-years 288 74 132 75
Observed wage cuts (Y) 206 53 122 29
Proportion of wage cuts (%) 3.54 3.39 4.52 1.97
Simulation results:
Average simulated wage cuts 265 67 146 48
#(b Y > Y B) 4995 4537 4811 4927
Probability of signiﬁcance 0.001 0.093 0.038 0.015
Fraction of wage cuts prevented 0.223 0.209 0.164 0.396
Fraction of industries aected 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.013
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